Lives in the Balance: Why Doping Control Matters

As the Tour de France rolls onto stage 7, few in the general public know of the story of 21-year-old Linas Rumsas, but they need to consider it. Especially on this day, July 13, 2018, the 51^st anniversary of cyclist Tommy Simpson’s death.

People ask us all the time why doping control matters. Some argue that it doesn’t and that we should just let folks use what they want. A doping free-for-all. Cynics might say that plenty of dopers have already escaped through the net in sports, at least for a time: Lance Armstrong, Tim Montgomery, Marion Jones, to name a few.

Linas Rumsas was an up-and-coming cyclist whose life was cut short after he abused performance-enhancing drugs. Photo: Team Altopack-Eppela

The story of young Linas, a promising cyclist whose life was cut short after abusing performance-enhancing drugs, reminds us that doping can kill. We would be wise to remember that it has happened before. Linas’ story is one of the saddest we have come across and it powerfully demonstrates why many of us who have chosen to pursue anti-doping continue to do so. This one story illuminates in no uncertain terms the realities of what we all face with the scourge of doping, and yet outside of Italy and frequent readers of Cycling News, few sports fans have probably heard of it.

There have been others who have perished from doping. According to ProCon, which provides a comprehensive historical timeline of doping in sports, the first modern athlete chronicled to have died from doping was the Danish cyclist Knut Jensen at the Summer Olympics in Rome in 1960. Heat was the initial culprit but his autopsy found traces of Ronicol. ProCon describes Ronicol as an amphetamine, but Ronicol would be described more accurately as a vasodilator and can be used as an anti-ischemia drug. Though it is not on the 2018 WADA Prohibited List, it is similar to meldonium in many ways.

Stop to consider that the first drug to have been implicated in the death of an athlete in the Olympics in 1960 is not banned today! Ronicol, otherwise known as nicotinyl alcohol, is not prohibited as confirmed by the Global DRO. Its cousin meldonium wasn’t prohibited by WADA until 2016, when it caused hundreds of athletes to test positive. Some might like to think that doping is behind the peloton, but we fear it may still be in the middle. Just in a form we don’t currently define as doping, like Ronicol.

Fifty one years ago today on July 13, 1967, Tommy Simpson infamously died on the slopes of Mount Ventoux during Stage 13 of the Tour at the age of 29. His death was one of the central moments in anti-doping history. Shortly thereafter that same year the International Olympic Committee (IOC) created the IOC Medical Commission and the first drug testing began at the Olympics in 1968, with narcotics and stimulants making up the initial prohibited list. Steroids were not added until 1975.

There have been other examples of athlete deaths that have been seminal. MLB pitcher Steve Bechler, of the Baltimore Orioles, died during drills in 2003. Ephedrine was indicated as a contributing cause in his premature death, which played a role in the regulation of ephedrine as a dietary supplement ingredient in the United States.

Steroids have played a role in the demise of many young athletes, including Taylor Hooton, Efrain Marrero, and just two days ago, a young 18-year-old Irishman in Limerick. Numerous stories exist of athletes who went too far with blood doping, or performed transfusions the wrong way, leading to dire consequences. Many stories are out there but few are known to the broader sporting public.

Linas Rumsas’ story reminds us that the scourge of doping is still present and that it is just as deadly today as it was in 1967 when amphetamines derailed the promising life and career of Mr. Simpson.

Linas Rumsas is the son of Raimondas Rumsas, who himself was a professional cyclist and took third place in the 2002 Tour de France. After Raimondas’ wife Edita was caught with a van full of drugs on the way home from that Tour, they both received four-month suspended sentences in 2006. Raimondas later tested positive for EPO during the 2003 Giro d’Italia. Sadly, this experience did not seem to deter them from apparently assisting their two children with doping.

Linas rode for the Altopack-Eppela squad in Italy and had already been a national road race champion. But in May 2017, he died at age 21 of a heart attack. It was nearly 50 years to the day after Mr. Simpson had died.

Upon Linas’ death, police searched his family’s home and seized a number of banned substances and medications. In September 2017, his older brother Raimondas Jr. tested positive for the prohibited substance GHRP-6, a peptide that produces natural growth hormone. It seems a cocktail of banned substances and other medications were being used at the family home.

The result of all this has been one family torn apart, again, from doping. Perhaps doping didn’t matter to the Rumsas family either until their son died. But Linas didn’t just die, if the allegations in this case hold true. He died as a result of family support and encouragement to dope.

It gets worse. In the course of the investigation, six people have been arrested in an apparent team-sponsored doping program including the team owner, directeur sportif, pharmacist, and trainer, who stand accused of providing drugs to riders. Seventeen other people are being investigated. Sadly, however, it is too late for Linas.

Unfortunately, the recent decision to allow Chris Froome to ride again with no sanctions after testing positive for elevated levels of salbutamol has called into question the validity and utility of the anti-doping system, again, at least in some people’s eyes. WADA has tried to explain the reasoning now, including clarifying the levels (1,428 ng/ml of urine, when adjusted for specific gravity, which is above the decision limit of 1,200 ng/ml). The reasons may not satisfy everyone, or anyone, but Froome’s case is certainly not a reason to give up on anti-doping.

Linas’ story personifies why giving up on anti-doping is simply not an option and should remind us all that doping is a significant matter. In fact, it is all the more reason to recognize that the failures of the anti-doping system are largely due to a lack of resources and money. For that to change, more people will need to truly understand what is at stake when athletes dope and to demonstrate the will to do more to combat the problem.

– Oliver Catlin

The Monetary Gap – One Reason for the Lance Armstrong Affair

Yesterday much of the world had to watch Oprah to see Lance Armstrong confess his doping for the first time.  Even Lance agrees that should have happened long ago. 

One of the most troubling elements of all of this is that drug testing began in the Olympics in 1968 more than 44 years ago and yet the system is still unable to distinguish who is a clean athlete.  Every decade we are faced with a groundbreaking scandal, and multiple times a year we are faced with an ordinary scandal resulting from doping in sport.  Just last week we finished a baseball hall of fame vote where a whole generation of players got snubbed largely because of doping, and yet it seemed ordinary. 

Lance Armstrong, Ben Johnson, Marion Jones, Tim Montgomery, Barry Bonds, Roger Clemens… the list is long and spans all sports and generations when it comes to sport heroes and champions who have fallen, some even sacrificing their lives like Tommy Simpson, from using performance-enhancing drugs.  The question facing us all is why and what should we do about it, in much the same way we ask why and what to do about gun violence after witnessing the Newtown disaster. 

Now some may say hold on, you are way out of line.  There is no way to compare innocent children dying in a horrifying massacre to the performance-enhancing drug problem.  While we would agree with that in large part, we also point out that children are tragically affected by performance-enhancing drugs, figuring they have to use them to compete.  Sadly, some of our children even sacrifice their lives in pursuit of steroids and other drugs.  Just ask the Hooton’s, or the Garibaldi’s, or the Marrero’s or the other parents that have paid the ultimate price in losing a child to the use of performance-enhancing drugs. 

We consider the annual budget of the World Anti-Doping Agency at ~$28 million annually and the United States Anti-Doping Agency at $14 million.  We assume UK Sport and Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority are equivalent to USADA for another $28 million.  The NFL spent $10 million in 2011.  We will put MLB at $10 million as well although their updated new program likely will come with additional cost.  The sport of cycling was estimated to spend $4.7 million and tennis (ITF) $1.3 million per year in 2011 for another $6 million.  If we assume there are 150 other countries and sporting bodies spending an average of $1-2 million annually on anti-doping, that adds another $150-300 million.  All said we estimate the total annual anti-doping budget worldwide to be $246-396 million, which compares to the budget of a small pharmaceutical company – and our estimate is probably on the high side. 

At the same time, you consider that Lance Armstrong made an estimated $17.5 million in endorsements alone in 2005.  Alex Rodriguez, another previous doper, makes $29 million per year in salary alone.  Annual budgets for professional cycling teams range from several million up to $25 million for a team like Sky.  The median team payroll in Major League Baseball is around $90 million while the total payroll for the league is a staggering $2.94 billion.  The total payroll in the NFL is even higher at almost $3.4 billion.  Finally consider the $3.2 billion in endorsement contracts for Nike athletes alone over the next 5 years.  All told, professional and Olympic athletes and teams have easily more than $10 billion in annual resources. 

When Lance Armstrong’s endorsements plus A-Rod’s salary alone totals more than $46.5 million, eclipsing the WADA and USADA annual budgets by $4.5 million.  When the drug-testing programs for MLB and NFL represent 0.3% of annual player salaries.  When the estimated annual amount spent worldwide on anti-doping testing, legal matters and research at ~$246-396 million represents 2-4% of the more than $10 billion in resources available to athletes perhaps we begin to see the scope of the problem.  Those who want to dope can afford to beat the system; at present the monetary gap is simply too great for the system to overcome. 

Now we consider the response.  There have already been countless hours of media content alone dedicated to Lance Armstrong.  We tried to estimate the dollars spent and considered 500 media outlets spending an average of $10,000 each on the coverage.  That would be $5 million alone spent covering the issue worldwide, by the end of this whole affair it is likely to be 10 or 50 times that amount, and our estimate is likely conservative. 

Those of us in the anti-doping community don’t expect $6 billion to be dropped off anytime soon, but it would be nice to see the resources available to anti-doping double or triple at least.  If we can’t afford to give anti-doping a fighting chance by providing the movement with the financial resources needed to effectuate change, then we are part of the problem and we can settle in for a continuing parade of scandals. 

It is up to sport and those that care about it to ensure adequate resources are available to establish and maintain a reality of clean competition.  The athletes, sport, and the next generations of athletes and sports fans deserve a drug testing system that can deliver to the world clean sporting champions, ones we can believe in and trust.  With an outmatched system that can’t expose dirty athletes, even athletes who want to compete clean feel they have to dope to win, and we simply can’t accept that reality.  The risks are too great to sport and the individuals who dedicate their lives to it. 

But it is not just about the money, it is about finding real solutions that can improve the drug-testing system and approach in place today, with or without more resources.  Stay tuned as our dinner conversations have been generating some interesting ideas….

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Egregious error in high-profile Sports Illustrated story by Selena Roberts & David Epstein exposed

Los Angeles,  March 29, 2011

Egregious Error in Sports Illustrated Story by Selena Roberts & David Epstein Exposed

USOC Committee Meeting Notes Reveal Truth

Anti-Doping Research (ADR) has obtained a copy of meeting notes of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) meeting of March 2000, referenced as “the minutes” in the misleading Jan. 24 Sports Illustrated Lance Armstrong story by Selena Roberts and David Epstein.  Attorneys at Time, Inc. finally provided an excerpt of the notes after repeated requests.

As suspected, the notes show that contrary to Roberts and Epstein’s claims, the committee, with Dr. Catlin often leading the way, was not only trying to do everything it could within the existing framework to ensure an effective doping system in the United States, it was attempting to raise the testing standards and make them more stringent for athletes.

The meeting notes are crucial for providing the appropriate context and demonstrate that Roberts and Epstein’s written and press interview statements charging that Dr. Catlin and officials discuss in the meeting how “to informally test athletes–not to sanction them but to help them avoid testing positive at the Olympics” are patently false.  Indeed, the writers and editor(s) either do not understand or willfully ignore the context of the discussion.

To help shed light on the situation and be as transparent as possible, Dr. Catlin and ADR are taking the step of releasing the USOC meeting notes.  Because the discussion is complex and difficult to follow, Dr. Catlin is offering a statement on the context of the meeting and an annotated version of the notes that adds helpful and insightful comments.  You may click the following links to pdfs of Dr. Catlin’s Statement and Annotated Notes as well as the Raw Version of the Notes.

The primary issue at hand was how to apply Dr. Catlin’s new, complex, and, at that time, legally untested Carbon Isotope Ratio (CIR) test to confirm testosterone use in U.S. athlete samples prior to the Summer Olympics in Sydney.  For his part, Dr. Catlin wanted to see his test implemented in the United States and was doing what he could to advance it.

“I want to see better and better doping (control),” he said.  “And it’s (the CIR test is) ready to go… and I submit that there’s tons and tons of political and legal reasons not to do it and to do it.  I’m making a statement that I’m willing to go to court to defend the test, and I wouldn’t have made that statement until very recently.”

The group was reviewing the rules for screening for testosterone use by applying the testosterone to epitestosterone (T/E) ratio to see how the follow-up CIR confirmation test could be applied.  A key issue discussed was what constituted an initial positive T/E finding.  According to the IOC, the relevant governing body at the time, only a sample with a T/E ratio of 6:1 or higher was an initial positive.  The IOC rules included the ability to use CIR for follow-up testing while the USOC protocol under discussion did not mention CIR use.

Dr. Catlin and others on the committee considered implementing tougher standards than the IOC rules allowed, by applying the CIR test to samples in which the T/E ratio was in the more stringent 4:1 to 6:1 range.  In fact, Dr. Catlin had lobbied the IOC to adopt the more stringent T/E range, a point he mentions in the meeting.  The meeting notes reveal the group struggling with how to use CIR for sanctioning purposes given the concern that prosecution of testosterone doping offenses in which the T/E ratio was less than 6:1 would be unsuccessful under the current IOC framework.

The members discussed if and how U.S. athletes should be introduced to the new test, with some wanting to warn athletes and others not wanting to warn them.  Those who argued for warning athletes were doing so out of a desire to compel as many of them as possible to clean up—the point of doping control—and for a time the IOC required such warnings.  Again contrary to Roberts and Epstein’s claims, Dr. Catlin argued that alerting the USOC, so that they could warn athletes, was not necessary.  “I don’t (care) whether you guys are alerted in advance,” he said.  “If we want to put a test in before the Games, we’ll do it.”

As a potential compromise, a committee member floated the idea of doing an informal study applying the CIR test to a group of 50 samples in which the T/E ratio measured in the more stringent 4:1 to 6:1 range.  The purpose of this proposal was to assess the potential of doping prevalence, as good, credible science-based anti-doping programs do.  Research studies are, by proper protocol, anonymous, as Dr. Catlin told the group.

Although Dr. Catlin believed in the science behind the CIR test and was pressing to use it for sanctioning purposes, he was open to the idea of a compromise because he believed that the results would help push the IOC to adopt the more stringent standard.  A precedent had been established with similar research conducted by the IOC at the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics, he noted, though he remained, as always, opposed to “no-penalty testing.”

In the end the motion to conduct the research study was withdrawn, and no such study was conducted.  Five years later, in 2005, the World Anti-Doping Agency lowered the benchmark for an initial positive testosterone test result to a T/E ratio of 4:1.

The CIR test is considered revolutionary and has proven highly effective; despite many challenges by athletes testing positive, the Court of Arbitration for Sport has never found any fault with it.

The blatant mischaracterization of the USOC meeting is merely one of several egregious errors Anti-Doping Research has found in the Jan. 24 Sports Illustrated feature story by Selena Roberts and David Epstein.

Don Catlin, M.D., responds to Sports Illustrated story by Selena Roberts & David Epstein on Lance Armstrong

Los Angeles, January 27, 2011

Statement of Anti-Doping Research (ADR) on recent Sports Illustrated story by Selena Roberts and David Epstein:

A high-profile feature story on Lance Armstrong in the Jan. 24 issue of Sports Illustrated has led to NPR and CNN interviews for its writers, Selena Roberts and David Epstein.  Unfortunately, both their story and their interviews contain innuendo and mischaracterize key elements, including perhaps most notably, urine tests performed by Don Catlin, M.D., back in the mid-1990s.

Dr. Catlin, a widely respected pioneer in the field of anti-doping in sport, wishes to set the record straight.  In the detailed statement that follows, he demonstrates his respect for the truth as he knows it as well as his commitment to transparency.

As he states, he was not aware that the A samples allegedly testing high for testosterone in 1993, 1994 and 1996 were Lance Armstrong’s, if, in fact, that is the case.  We have seen no evidence to suggest that it is.

Sports drug-testing laboratories are required to use codes, not names, for samples to protect all parties and the sanctity of the process.  Dr. Catlin and his team followed those rules during his tenure as director of the UCLA Olympic Analytical Lab.

Further, during the years in question, Dr. Catlin and the world at large did not even know who Lance Armstrong was.  Mr. Armstrong had not yet established himself as a champion cyclist and Tour de France winner.

We find that the elements of Ms. Roberts and Mr. Epstein’s story that involve Dr. Catlin lack credibility.  The reporters have delivered a story that misrepresents the truth.

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Statement of Don Catlin, M.D.

Background:

I was the founder and Director of the UCLA Olympic laboratory from its inception in 1982 until I left UCLA 25 years later (2007).  The lab was accredited by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1983 and it was the first sport testing lab in the United States.  The laboratory performed the testing for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, the steroid testing for the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, and the testing for the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games.  During those years the sample numbers grew from 2,000 to over 50,000 samples per year making it the largest sport-testing lab in the world.

During my tenure, I performed drug testing on behalf of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), the National Football League (NFL), the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), Major League Baseball (MLB), the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the U.S. federal government and many other organizations.  I have spent my whole career dedicated to building the ethos and system of anti-doping that we have today.  Violating that system in any way would be anathema to everything I believe in.

As a laboratory director, I often responded to legitimate requests for information about the results.  Guiding those requests and the whole testing process are the cardinal features of all sport testing contracts: 1) samples are identified only by a code number, 2) only the testing agency (for example USADA) can connect the name of the athlete to the code number, and 3) nobody at the laboratory knows the name of the athletes.  The testing is anonymous.

For as long as I can remember, laboratory directors and their staffs have been forbidden by anti-doping agencies from discussing cases with the media.  Today, this is formalized within the World Anti-Doping Agency’s Code of Ethics of the International Standard for Laboratories.

On Wade Exum:

Wade Exum was the Director of Drug Control at the USOC from 1991 through 2000.  The article refers to Exum’s lawsuit against the USOC upon his termination and also to Exum’s allegations of “letting positive drug tests slide.”  As the article mentions, “Exum’s lawsuit was dismissed for lack of evidence.”

Later in the article, Wade Exum is quoted as saying “Out of tens of thousands of tests purchased during my tenure as Director of Drug Control at the USOC, I can remember only one T/E ratio being called positive.”

I have reviewed my records and they reveal that the UCLA Lab reported more than 25 urine samples with T/E values greater than 6 to the USOC between 1992 and 2000.  As the lab director, reporting to the USOC fulfilled my obligations I had no authority or ability to take further action against the athlete; the authority to take action against the athlete rested solely with the USOC or other appropriate agency.  I would not have the ability to take further action against an athlete as I only work with sample codes and would not know the identities of those testing positive or negative.

On the minutes of USOC anti-doping committee meetings:

I spoke with the co-author of the Sports Illustrated article, David Epstein, in a telephone conversation between January 13-19, just before his article was published.  During the conversation, I asked for a copy of the meeting minutes to which the article refers.  It is important to understand the context of the meeting to appropriately comment.  Mr. Epstein told me that he either could not or would not provide the meeting minutes.  Since the publication of the article, I have asked the USOC for a copy of the minutes but have not yet received one.  I have also formally requested a copy from the editors of SI through counsel and am awaiting a response.

I have attended hundreds of meetings in my career and cannot recall all of the topics discussed.  It is impossible to comment on the context of a meeting after being read a few lines from minutes that are almost eleven years old.  I am confident that if provided with the context I could easily explain any statements in the minutes and their relevance to the advancement of the anti-doping system in general as that has always been my creed.

On the USA Cycling letter to Catlin from May 1999:

The article describes a May 1999 letter from USA Cycling to me asking for the testosterone-epitestosterone (T/E) ratios “for a cyclist identified only by his drug-testing code numbers.”  Allegedly, “a source with knowledge of the request says that the cyclist was Lance Armstrong.”

The article suggests that the letter referred to one cyclist, but the letter is not directly quoted.  It is unclear if the letter in fact requested results for one cyclist or whether it was a general request for results on a group of lab codes not tied to any individual.  Again, I have asked David Epstein for a copy of the letter.  As of January 26, it has not been provided.

The article makes it clear that the request included only code numbers.  As a result, I could not have known the identity of the athlete or athletes included in the request.  Regardless of the specifics, such requests were very common and routine; I had numerous such requests in the course of my career.

Catlin’s letter to USA Cycling dated June 4, 1999 (see 4 numbered comments):

An excerpt of the article describes my response to USA Cycling:

“In a letter dated June 4, 1999, Catlin responded that the lab couldn’t recover a total of five of the cyclist’s test results from 1990, 1992 and 1993, adding, ‘the likelihood that we will be able to recover these old files is low.’ The letter went on to detail the cyclist’s testosterone-epitestosterone results from 1991 to 1998, with one missing season: 1997, the only year during that span in which Armstrong didn’t compete. Three results stand out: a 9.0-to-1 ratio from a sample collected on June 23, 1993; a 7.6-to-1 from July 7, 1994; and a 6.5-to-1 from June 4, 1996.”

Again, I have asked for a copy of this letter, but it has not been provided.

1 – Background necessary to understand the testing methods and reporting:

The urine samples are collected at the testing site by trained collectors who follow a detailed protocol and do not work at the lab.  Each sample is split into two portions (A and B) while the athlete observes.  Samples from one athlete are labeled, for example: 123456A and 123456B.  At the lab, the A samples are screened and the B samples are stored intact.  If the A screen is negative, the lab reports a negative result to the agency.  If the A shows evidence of a drug, the laboratory performs an A confirmation.  If the A confirmation is positive, the laboratory reports an adverse result to the agency.  The agency informs the athlete, who may choose to make an appointment for a representative to come to the laboratory to watch his or her B sample confirmation.  If the B confirmation confirms the adverse finding, the laboratory reports an adverse result to the agency that requested the test, the relevant national governing body, and an international body such as the IOC or WADA (The details of the reporting pathway changed over the years).

2 – On the request for data from five samples from 1990, 1992 and 1993:

In 1990, 1992 and 1993 we did not have the consistent electronic archive options that are available today.  The data was stored on magnetic tape and other similar media that were not always consistent in their performance.  When older data could not be found it was usually because the storage medium had deteriorated and the data was no longer in archive directories.  In the 1990s, WADA did not exist and the labs were managed by the IOC.  The IOC-accredited laboratories were not required to retain the data on samples declared negative, although it was our practice to retain all electronic data while I was at UCLA and respond to requests similar to the alleged request from USA Cycling if the data still existed.

3 – On the three T/E results from 1993, 1994 and 1996 discussed in the article:

When the laboratory would have originally received the samples in question, identified only by a number, not only did no lab employee, including myself, know the name of the athlete, but nobody knew whether the athlete had ever been tested before or would ever be tested again.  All three were reported long before Armstrong won his first Tour de France and became famous; I had no idea who he was at the time.  In a response letter of the sort described from June 4, 1999, I would merely be describing results that had been obtained and reported independently from one another several years earlier.

It was not an unexpected occurrence to have samples with screen T/E ratios between 6.0 and 7.5 not confirm.  It would be less likely, however, that a sample that screens at 9.0 does not confirm.

4 – Background necessary to understand T/E ratio results:

To determine whether a sample’s T/E is greater than 6, the lab must measure it.  Inherent to any and all kinds of measurements is a certain amount of “measurement uncertainty.”  To confirm a T/E greater than 6, statistical analysis of the measurements obtained for the sample and standards must meet certain criteria.  Sometimes those strict criteria are not met by samples whose T/E is above 6.  In addition to these mathematical criteria, a host of other requirements must be met in order to confirm a positive T/E result, which would be described in the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) relevant at the time.  In other words, the lab, accreditation, and drug-testing system require the lab to report positive results only when the data meet the strict standards laid out in the SOP.

The T/E ratio is a very complicated test and the interpretation of the test results are equally difficult.(3,4)  A ratio greater than 6 does not prove that the individual used testosterone.  It does mean that additional tests are necessary.  Nowadays, thanks to research conducted by a handful of scientists, many of which I have had the pleasure of working with, laboratories perform the Carbon Isotope Ratio test to help clarify the results.  However, before the CIR test was available starting in the late 1990s, one approach was to collect three more samples from the athlete at least several weeks apart and study the results.  Exactly how to do this is explained in a peer-reviewed paper that I wrote with colleagues and published in 1996.(4)  Reading these papers today will provide the serious student of this issue with considerable insight.

On Mark Levinstein’s visit to the UCLA Olympic Analytical Lab in 2005:

As a doping-control lab director and anti-doping scientist, a key element of my mission is to educate students, attorneys, journalists, and the public about relevant issues surrounding drugs in sports.  This includes educating attorneys about how lab testing is done.  I have done this countless times over the years, sometimes one on one, sometimes in small groups and occasionally with very large groups.  Examples include delivering a two-day educational seminar to some 30 North American arbitrators in 2001.  In addition, I have conducted numerous lectures and broadcasts for hundreds if not thousands of attorneys in my career.

I do recall Mark Levinstein asking to visit the lab in 2005 for a tutorial on EPO.  At first, I delayed because I was busy and I knew that he also represented Lance Armstrong on some matters.  I asked if this was on behalf of Lance Armstrong or any other athlete.  The answers were ‘no’.  In addition, he added that he knew I had educated groups of attorneys and that was all he was looking for.  Eventually I consented to his visit.

On the appointed day, I introduced Levinstein to my EPO staff, which included Andreas Breidbach.  I did not monitor the conversations.  Although employees are not allowed to discuss cases, it seems from Breidbach’s quotes that he spoke in general of the quality of the testing in the Paris lab.  Obviously, Breidbach did not heed the rules.  As far as I know, no harm came from that incident.  I would not have had any discussions with Levinstein about the case.

I will also point out that during the course of B-confirmations athlete representatives, including attorneys, are allowed to witness the entire testing process.  It was hardly the first time an attorney had been educated on these matters.

Philosophy Behind 2009 Lance Armstrong Monitoring Program:

I was approached to help develop a monitoring program for Lance Armstrong’s comeback in 2009.  As initially conceived, it would have been the first time that any testing organization would be allowed to sample and test Armstrong every three days or even more often and make the analytical data available online for anyone interested to see.  My laboratory would have had unrestricted ability to perform any test we wanted.  Under those circumstances, I did not believe that anybody could get away with cheating.  I was interested to proceed.

Clarification on the intended Armstrong monitoring program:

We were aiming to collect from Armstrong on average every three days throughout the cycling season.  Such a program would be very challenging logistically and would be quite expensive.  It would also likely impact the activities of the international doping control process.  We did not want to impede or interfere with the sanctioning bodies’ ability to test Armstrong, which we knew they would do frequently.

As negotiations were wrapping up, we did perform one collection prior to abandoning the program.  The logistical and cost realities became immediately apparent.  In addition, there were difficulties with the publicity surrounding the program.

The article says that “In its months of overseeing Armstrong’s testing program, Catlin’s lab had collected only one urine sample from him, … and it is clean.”

It is correct that only one sample was collected, however we had only overseen the program for one day, not months.  The results were free of any blood profile abnormalities, the urine was negative for EPO analogues and had a T/E ratio below 4.

References:

While preparing this response I relied on my general knowledge of doping, personal files, specific publications and the following articles:

1) Roberts S and Epstein D.  The Case Against Lance Armstrong.  Sports Illustrated.  January 2011.

2)  Catlin DH, Murray TH.  Performance Enhancing Drugs, Fair Competition, and Olympic Sport.  J American Medical Association 1996;276:231-237. (describes doping control and the system)

3)  Catlin DH, Hatton CK, Starcevic S.  Issues in detecting xenobiotic anabolic steroids and testosterone by analysis of athletes’ urine. Clinical Chemistry 1997;43:1280-1288. http://www.clinchem.org/cgi/reprint/43/7/1280.  (explains the TE ratio in detail)

4)  Catlin DH, Cowan DA, de la Torre R, Donike M, Fraisse D, Oftebro H, Hatton CK, Starcevic B, de la Torre X, Norli H, Geyer H, Walker CJ.  Urinary testosterone (T) to epitestosterone (E) ratios by GC/MS.  I.  Initial comparison of uncorrected T/E in six international laboratories.   J Mass Spectrometry 1996;31:397-402.  (measurement of the TE ratio)

5)  Essay dedication: Coleman DL and Coleman, JE.  The Problem of Doping.  Duke University School of Law.  Duke Law Journal, 2008.

6) Anonymous, Current Biography®, March 2010 issue, 2010. The H.W. Wilson Company (www.hwwilson.com). (Catlin’s career)

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